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Verbal irony, a form of figurative language, uses the discrepancy between a speaker‟s intended 
meaning and the literal word meanings to achieve social goals. Yet, little research exists on individual 
differences that may disrupt irony understanding. Verbal irony may challenge shy children, who tend to 
interpret ambiguous stimuli as being threatening, and who have difficulties with mentalizing in social 
contexts. This study assessed whether shy children interpret ironic statements differently than do non-
shy children. Children (8- to11-year-olds) listened to stories wherein one character made a statement to 
another character that was a literal or ironic criticism or a literal or ironic compliment. Children 
appraised the speaker‟s belief and communicative intention. Shyness was assessed using self report 
measures of social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect. Shy children did not differ from non-shy 
peers in comprehending speakers‟ beliefs. However, shy children rated speakers who made ironic 
criticisms as being more mean than did children low in shyness. Thus, while understanding that 
speakers intended to communicate their true beliefs, shy children construed the social meaning of irony 
differently, indicating difficulties with pragmatics. Such subtle differences in pragmatic understanding 
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Communicative competence requires that children learn more than the semantics and syntax of 
language. To be effective communicators, children also require an appreciation of pragmatics; the 
functional use of language in social contexts. In mature communication, the intended meaning of a 
speaker‟s utterance often goes beyond the literal meaning of the words spoken. In fact, our language is 
inherently ambiguous; the same words can have various meanings depending on the beliefs and 
intentions of the speaker. To reduce this ambiguity, speakers and listeners must use contextual cues, 
tonality, and knowledge of their conversational partners‟ mental states to infer meaning. Figurative 
language, which includes metaphor, hyperbole, understatement and irony, highlights this 
communicative ambiguity, since the literal meaning of the words differs from the speaker‟s intended 
meaning. While previous research on figurative language understanding has predominantly focused on 
the developmental sequence of children‟s burgeoning communicative competence, or on the cognitive 
skills supporting this development, the present study focuses on whether children‟s trait characteristics 
play a role. Specifically, we assessed whether children who report high levels of shyness have more 
difficulty interpreting figurative language, and, in particular, verbal irony. 
Counterfactual verbal irony is one form of figurative language, where the literal meaning of the 
words spoken is directly opposite to the intended meaning of the speaker (Katz & Lee, 1993).  Irony, 
thus defined, can exist as either ironic criticisms, where the intended meaning is negative or mocking 
(e.g. saying “nice shot” after a friend misses making a basketball toss), or as ironic compliments, where 
the intended meaning is positive (e.g. saying “I hated it!” after finishing a delicious dessert). 
The incongruity between the literal word meaning and the intended meaning of ironic 
statements serves several social functions. People choose to use verbal irony to be humorous, to soften 
insults, and to demonstrate control of their emotions (Dews, Kaplan, & Winner, 1995). Using verbal 
irony, especially when criticizing another, achieves these latter social goals because the meaning of the 




considered less negative than literal criticisms, thereby allowing speakers to state their opinion whilst 
maintaining their friendship by doing so in a less aggressive manner. However, at the same time, the 
muting function of irony renders ironic compliments less positive than literal compliments. Speakers 
may use ironic compliments when they are envious of a listener‟s accomplishments (Dews et al., 1995) 
or to highlight a listener‟s unwarranted expectations of failure (e.g., when a student believes she has 
failed an exam when she actually aced it).  
Children encounter verbal irony frequently. For example, verbal irony is common during 
conversations within the family environment (Recchia, Howe, Ross, & Alexander, 2010) and it is 
commonly found in children‟s television programming (Dews & Winner, 1997). Considering the 
ubiquity of irony in everyday conversation and experience, as well as the social functions it serves, 
verbal irony understanding is an important component of developing social and communicative 
competence.  
Several studies have examined the course of verbal irony development in typically developing 
children (e.g., Capelli, Nakagawa, & Madden, 1990; also see Pexman, 2008 for a review). Recent work 
has demonstrated that children as young as 5 or 6 years old are able to understand the beliefs and ironic 
intent of speakers making ironic criticisms, in presented stories about 20-50% of the time (Climie & 
Pexman, 2008; Filippova & Astington, 2008). Specifically, for ironic criticisms children understand 
that speakers can say something different than they believe before they understand the speaker‟s 
teasing intention and attitude (i.e., how mean or nice the speaker is trying to be), which occur together 
(Pexman & Glenwright, 2007).  
While the ability to understand ironic criticisms has been shown in young school-aged 
children, the ability to understand ironic compliments begins to emerge at 8 to 9 years of age (Climie & 
Pexman, 2008), with many 10- and 11-year-olds demonstrating difficulty comprehending this form of 
figurative language (Pexman, Glenwright, Krol, & James, 2005). In contrast to the developmental 




can say something different than they believe and that they intend to tease the target of an ironic 
compliment before they understand the speaker‟s attitude (Pexman & Glenwright, 2007). 
In addition to the studies examining the developmental progression of verbal irony 
understanding, several studies have elucidated the underlying cognitive skills that are required for 
children to appreciate the pragmatics of irony. Filippova and Astington (2008), for example, found that 
children‟s vocabulary skills and theory of mind (i.e., ability to understand the knowledge, beliefs and 
intentions of others), were good predictors of verbal irony comprehension. Theory of mind has been 
found to facilitate verbal irony comprehension in both typically developing populations (Nilsen, 
Glenwright, & Huyder, in press; Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995) and in clinical populations, such 
as children with autism (Happé, 1995). Verbal irony comprehension may also be supported by 
executive function skills (Hala, Pexman, Climie, Rostad, & Glenwright, 2010). For example, children‟s 
working memory has been found to relate to verbal irony understanding (Filippova & Astington, 2008). 
In addition, studies with right hemisphere brain-damaged adult patients, have found a link between 
executive functioning and verbal irony comprehension (Martin & McDonald, 2006). Thus, several 
underlying skills assist children‟s appreciation of irony, including vocabulary, theory of mind, working 
memory and executive functioning. 
In addition to possessing the underlying cognitive skills necessary for successful irony 
comprehension, children also require exposure to social contexts to learn about this language form 
(Hala et al., 2010). Communicative interactions provide children with the opportunity to access the 
private mental states of others (Nelson, 2005). Such experience is important for irony comprehension, 
where understanding the mental state of the speaker is essential for successful interpretation. If children 
are not provided with adequate social exposure, they may not have the same experiential learning to 
support pragmatic development. There is likely a bidirectional relationship, however, in that children 
with poor pragmatic skills may not be able to keep up with the social demands of peer interactions. For 
example, research suggests that children with language deficits, including pragmatics, have peer 




considered an important component of social competence (Leinonen, Ryder, Ellis, & Hammond, 
2003), and has been shown to be related to prosocial behavior with peers (Coplan & Weeks, 2009). 
Furthermore, poor performance on the faux pas task, where children must determine the intentions of a 
speaker who unwittingly insults another character, is related to negative peer relations. Specifically, 
children who show poor faux pas understanding are rated by their classmates less favorably than are 
children who perform well on the task (Banerjee & Watling, 2005). Thus, difficulties with pragmatic 
language can lead to negative social outcomes including decreased quality or quantity of social 
experience, which, reciprocally, may exacerbate communicative difficulties.  
Although relationships exist between pragmatic communication skills and social outcomes, 
little work has been done investigating the role of individual differences in social behaviour that could 
impact children‟s pragmatic understanding, including understanding figurative language. One way to 
examine the role that socially relevant individual differences play in children‟s interpretations of 
figurative language is to study the comprehension of this language form in a population of children 
who exhibit difficulties in social contexts. Children who are shy, or who experience symptoms of 
social anxiety, constitute one group of children who demonstrate social difficulties. Shy children are 
understood as being temperamentally „behaviorally inhibited‟ (Kagan, 1989). Behavioral inhibition is 
the biologically-based tendency to be withdrawn and emotionally subdued in unfamiliar situations. 
Children with this temperament are characterized as quiet, vigilant and restrained when assessing novel 
stimuli. Behavioral inhibition is associated with anxiety symptoms in non-clinical adolescents (Muris, 
Merckelbach, Wessel, & van de Ven, 1999; Muris, Meesters, de Kanter, & Timmerman, 2005). Given 
that children who are shy avoid unfamiliar peers and speak less during social interactions (Asendorpf, 
1990) it is likely they are not being provided with the same opportunities to learn the nuances of social 
communication. 
Children who are shy or socially withdrawn have also been found to have language skills that 
differ from their same-aged peers. For example, shyness is associated with learning disorders (Elliott, 




Specifically, reticent school-aged children perform poorly on tests of both receptive and expressive 
language (Evans, 1996), and shy children have been shown to speak less when interacting with others 
(Asendorpf & Meier, 1993). Furthermore, a recent study found that shyness and pragmatic language 
abilities are negatively correlated (Coplan & Weeks, 2009). That is, children who were less able to 
provide socially appropriate verbal responses to common social scenarios were rated by their peers as 
demonstrating greater social withdrawal (Coplan & Weeks, 2009). In the present study we examined 
whether children‟s degree of shyness was related to another aspect of pragmatic competence: their 
ability to successfully appreciate verbal irony. Since verbal irony is clearly evaluative, involving 
criticism or praise, the social costs of misinterpreting verbal irony could be significant.  
There is reason to believe that verbal irony could pose a particular difficulty for shy children. 
As stated above, by nature of the incongruity between the literal word meaning and intended meaning 
of the speaker, verbal irony has an element of ambiguity. In light of the difficulties that shy children 
have with language and pragmatics, it is likely that shy children will have difficulty with language that 
is less straightforward. Furthermore, several lines of research indicate that anxious children have an 
interpretation bias for ambiguous information, leading them to interpret ambiguous stimuli as 
threatening. For example, when homographs were presented to anxious children and adolescents, 
anxious children were more likely to form sentences using the threatening or hostile interpretation of 
the homographs than were their non-anxious peers (Taghavi, Moradi, Neshat-Doost, Yule, & 
Dalgleish, 2000). Furthermore, when asked what they would do in several ambiguous scenarios, 
anxious children tended to interpret the situations as threatening, and suggest avoidant responses 
(Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1996). Thus, their tendency to experience ambiguous information as 
hostile or threatening may lead children with anxiety to misinterpret verbal irony. If this were the case, 
for ironic criticisms, there could be a reduced muting effect of irony. That is, shy children may perceive 
ironic criticisms as being similar to literal criticisms in terms of the attitude of the speaker. For ironic 
compliments, it may be that shy children make literal interpretations of the statements, failing to note 




Listeners use speaker characteristics (Katz, Blasco, &Kazmerski, 2004), facial expression and 
tone of voice (Dews & Winner, 1997) as cues in interpreting ironic remarks. Moreover, children rely 
on these cues, in particular, intonation, when interpreting sarcasm (Capelli et al, 1990). Interpreting 
subtle social cues and non-verbal communication have been shown to be difficult for children with 
social anxiety. For example, these children have been found to confuse sad and fearful voices (McClure 
& Nowicki, 2001). Moreover, another study demonstrated that children with higher shyness ratings had 
more difficulty appreciating the change of characters‟ emotions during a taped dialogue, especially 
when the emotions were negatively valenced (Rothenberg, 1970). This decreased ability to interpret 
subtle social cues is likely to impact verbal irony understanding where facial expression, tone of voice 
and contextual cues must be detected and evaluated correctly for the speaker‟s ironic intent to be 
accurately gauged.  
Children who are shy have also demonstrated weaker performance on tasks assessing the skills 
that underlie successful appreciation of verbal irony, such as theory of mind and reasoning within a 
social context. For example, anxious children were as accurate as non-anxious children at identifying 
overtly hostile actions on video, but were more likely than their non-anxious peers to label non-hostile 
accidental actions as being hostile (e.g., one child accidentally knocking over another child‟s blocks; 
Bell-Dolan, 1995). Similarly, work by Banerjee and Henderson (2001) demonstrates that children with 
shyness and shy negative affect, although able to pass 2
nd
 order false belief tasks, have difficulty 
understanding faux pas. Understanding faux pas is considered an advanced second order theory of 
mind task, representing the ability to infer what one person thinks about another person‟s thoughts. 
However, to a greater extent than 2
nd
 order false belief tasks, which also measure theory of mind, faux 
pas understanding involves a social component. That is, often in the faux pas stories one of the actors is 
unwittingly insulted. Faux pas tasks assess both the cognitive and motivational components of 
understanding the connection between people‟s thoughts and behaviors (Banerjee, 2000). Thus, when 
given ambiguous social stimuli, like verbal irony, shy or socially anxious children may have difficulty 




The main purpose of the present work was to examine the role shyness plays in children‟s 
comprehension and appreciation of verbal irony. To address this goal, children listened to stories 
wherein a speaker made a comment that was either a literal criticism, an ironic criticism, a literal 
compliment, or an ironic compliment. Children were asked to rate the speaker‟s belief as it related to 
the statement (i.e., whether the speaker thought the listener was “good” or “bad” at a certain activity), 
and the speaker‟s communicative intention (i.e., whether the speaker was being mean or nice). Children 
also rated whether they felt the speaker was teasing the listener. A secondary goal was to examine 
whether other social cognitive skills were affected by shyness. As such, children were also tested on 
their 2
nd
 order false belief and faux pas understanding.  
Children were asked to rate themselves on two aspects of shyness, social anxiety symptoms 
and shy negative affect (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001). While social anxiety symptoms tap into the 
social fears of shy youth, the shy negative affect scale assesses the negative emotions that are often 
associated with shy temperament. It was hypothesized that children with social anxiety symptoms and 
shy negative affect would have difficulty comprehending verbal irony. Due to previous findings that 
children with shyness have global language deficits, we were interested in examining whether these 
children have difficulty interpreting irony over and above any language deficits. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that shy children, with their tendency to interpret others in a hostile manner, would 
interpret ironic compliments literally, since the literal interpretation of the utterance is negative. 
Furthermore, similar to how shy children have difficulty appreciating speaker intentions in the faux pas 
task (Banerjee & Henderson, 2001), it was expected that shy children would rate ironic speakers of 
both ironic criticisms and ironic compliments as being meaner than would children who are not shy. 
That is, shy children would be less likely to appreciate the muting function of ironic criticisms, while 













 grade) in a mid-
sized North American city. In total, 99 children participated. Ten participants were excluded because 
their scores on the receptive vocabulary measure (described below) were below the Average Range 
(scaled score < 8, below the 25
th
 percentile), and one was excluded due to insufficient demographic 
information. The final dataset included 88 participants (51 boys; MAge = 9 years, 10 months; range: 8 
years, 1 month – 11 years, 9 months). Excluded participants did not differ from the remaining 
participants on age, gender, parental education, or measures of social anxiety and shy negative affect.  
Materials and Procedure  
Consent forms and demographic questionnaires were sent home with children at each participating 
school. Children with returned consent forms were tested by an experimenter within a quiet room in 
their schools. All children first completed the verbal irony task, then the 2
nd
 order false belief and faux 
pas tasks, followed by the shyness scales and the receptive language measure. All tasks were 
completed in one 45 minute session. 
Verbal irony task. The verbal irony task was comprised of 12 scenarios. Four versions of each 
scenario were created for a total of 48 stories. Stories depicted a female and a male character engaging 
in an activity that would be typical of the participants‟ age range, such as soccer and mini-golf. The 
stories depicted either a negative or a positive context (e.g. a child completely missing the hole, or a 
child scoring a hole-in-one playing mini-golf, respectively), followed by a statement (literal or ironic) 
made by the other child in the story. The statement was either a criticism or a compliment depending 
on the context of the story. Thus, four versions of each story were created, in which the speaker made a 
literal or ironic criticism (negative context) or a literal or ironic compliment (positive context). Each 
story included an introduction to the situation (e.g., Chris and Tara are playing mini-golf on a field 




was the object of the final statement (e.g., Tara thinks she is a really good mini-golf player.) This 
reference was included because previous studies have shown that verbal irony comprehension is 
improved when statements include an explicit echo of violated beliefs or norms (Keenan et al., 1999). 
Next, the negative or positive context was described (e.g., Tara hits the ball and completely misses the 
hole.; negative context), followed by the statement (e.g., Chris says: “Boy, that was an awesome 
shot!”; ironic criticism). Stories were of equal length in terms of number of words and number of 
sentences. Gender of speaker was counterbalanced across participants for each story type. Each 
participant heard one version of each of the 12 stories, and the 4 versions of each story were 
counterbalanced across participants, so that all 48 stories were approximately equally represented. This 
method of counterbalancing ensured that children‟s performance across story types did not vary as a 
function of the story salience. There were thus four sets of 12 stories. Within each set, the stories were 
presented in pseudo-randomized order with the requirement that the same story type did not occur three 
times in succession. A sample story demonstrating all four story types is included in Appendix A.  
The story events were presented to children in audio recordings to ensure standardized 
procedures. The final statements made by the speakers were presented with appropriate intonation. 
That is, the literal criticisms were made using a blunt, sincere tone; the ironic criticisms were made 
using a mocking tone; the literal compliments were made using a pleasant, sincere tone; and the ironic 
compliments were made using a pleasant, teasing tone. These statements were isolated from the rest of 
the recording and rated by psychology graduate students to ensure appropriate intonation. These 
students rated each statement as “literal” or “ironic”. Any stories that were not endorsed as being the 
appropriate story type were rerecorded until greater than 50% of raters agreed that the intonation 
matched the story type. A t-test comparing the literal and ironic intonation ratings of the final 
recordings confirmed that the ratings differed significantly (t(46) = 17.52, p < .001). 
Children were introduced to the task by being told that they would be listening to a series of 
stories while looking at comic strips. At the beginning of the verbal irony task, children were trained on 




include any figurative language. Then they were presented with the complete comic strip and heard the 
story events unfold on the recording. Following each story, children were asked questions to assess 
their interpretation of the scenario and final statement. These questions assessed the children‟s 
understanding of speaker belief, speaker intention, and whether or not the speaker was teasing. 
Children responded by pointing to cards and rating scales, which were adapted from Pexman, 
Glenwright, Hala, Kowbel, and Jungen, (2006), and Climie and Pexman (2008). In the speaker belief 
question children indicated using a “thumb up” or “thumb down” card whether the speaker thought the 
object of the final statement was good or bad (e.g., Did Chris think that Tara was a good mini-golf 
player or a bad mini-golf player?). When responding to the speaker intention question children used a 
5-point Likert type scale depicting faces ranging from “very nice” to “very mean” to indicate the 
attitude of the speaker. Similarly, in the speaker teasing question children used a card depicting a 
“teasing”, “neutral” or “real” face to depict whether the speaker was teasing. The order that the 
response options were read was counterbalanced across trials to prevent response bias.  
Second order false belief task. The 2
nd
 order false belief task was adapted from Coull, 
Leekam and Bennett (2006; see Appendix B). This task involved presenting children with two stories 
wherein two characters interacted. In both stories one character deceived a second character, while, 
unbeknownst to the first character, the second character witnessed the truth. Therefore the first 
character had a false belief about the second character‟s knowledge state. Children heard two audio-
recorded vignettes outlining the story details, accompanied by comics, provided frame-by-frame, to aid 
in comprehension and to serve as a memory aid. After listening to the story, children were asked a 
question to assess their 2
nd
 order false belief understanding, and were asked to justify their response. In 
order to be successful on these questions children were required to think about a character‟s thoughts 
about another characters‟ mental state. They were also asked probe questions to assess their 
understanding and memory of the story. Children received one point for correctly answering the false 
belief question, and received a second point if their justification explicitly referred to the thoughts of 
the character. Thus, children could earn a score of 0, 1 or 2 on each of the 2
nd




The two stories were averaged to obtain the children‟s mean false belief score, which was used in the 
final analyses.  
Faux pas task. Children‟s ability to interpret the intentions of characters within a social 
context was assessed using a faux pas task (Banerjee, 2000).  In this task, children heard two audio-
recorded stories in which one character unwittingly insulted another character, see Appendix C.  The 
stories were accompanied by comic strips to aid in comprehension and to serve as a memory aid.  After 
listening to the story, children were asked four questions.  They were first asked if someone had said 
something wrong in the story, and if so, who.  If they answered these questions correctly, they were 
asked if the character meant to hurt the other‟s feelings, and why.  Children were awarded one point for 
correct responses to each of these latter two questions.  Thus children could earn 0, 1 or 2 points on 
each faux pas story.  The scores on the two faux pas stories were averaged to yield the mean faux pas 
score, which was used for further analyses.   
Social anxiety and shy negative affect measures. Symptoms of social anxiety and shy 
negative affect were measured using rating scales. In order to assess children‟s perceptions of their 
social anxiety symptoms, the social phobia subscale of the Screen for Childhood Anxiety and Related 
Disorders (SCARED; Birmaher, Khetarpal, Cully, Brent & McKenzie, 1995) was administered to 
children. This measure probes the specific social fears that shy children experience, while also 
including one question directly probing shyness (i.e. “I am shy”). The seven statements were read 
aloud to children who responded verbally or by pointing to their answers on an answer card to indicate 
how true (0“not true/hardly ever true” to 2“always true/often true”) the statement was for them. A score 
was created by summing across the items. A recent meta-analysis concluded that the social phobia 
subscale of the SCARED is a reliable screening tool for social anxiety, with reported reliability alphas 
ranging from .69-.89 (Hale, Crocetti, Raaijmakers, & Meeus, 2011). 
To assess children‟s degree of shy negative affect, the Shy Negative Affect Scale (SNA; 
Banerjee & Henderson, 2001) was administered to children verbally. This scale assesses the negative 




statements (ten negative, two positive, which were reverse coded) were read aloud to children, and they 
responded how often they had each feeling by pointing to or stating their response (0“Never/Hardly 
Ever” to 2“Most of the time/Always). A score was created by summing across the items. This measure 
has been shown in the past to have acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach‟s alpha = .74; Banerjee 
& Henderson, 2001).  
Receptive vocabulary measure. In order to assess children‟s receptive vocabulary skills, they 
were administered the Picture Vocabulary subtest of the Test of Language Development-Intermediate, 
4
th
 Edition (TOLD-I:4). This task required that children point to the picture (from a group of 6 pictures 
on a card) that corresponded to a two word phrase spoken by the researcher. The task was 
administrated in a standardized fashion as outlined in the manual. Children completed all 9 picture 
cards included in the task. All children started at the first item of the first picture card and continued 
until all items for the card were completed or the ceiling criterion for the card (two incorrect responses 
in a row) was met. Children received one point for every correct response; these points were summed 













Social Anxiety Symptoms and Shy Negative Affect 
Children‟s responses on the self report measures of social anxiety symptoms (i.e., SCARED) and shy 
negative affect (i.e., SNA) were examined. Reliability analysis of children‟s responses to the SCARED 
revealed that one item had a much lower intraclass correlation (r(86) = 0.18) than any of the other 
items (rs(86) = 0.36 – 0.68). This item was removed, leaving 6 items (maximum possible score = 12) in 
the scale. Removal of this item increased the Cronbach alpha value from .78 to .82. Similarly, 
intraclass correlations of the items on the SNA revealed 4 items that did not correlate well to the other 
items of the measure (rs(86) = 0.01 – 0.11 versus 0.30 – 0.50). As such, these items were removed, 
leaving the final scale with 8 questions (maximum possible score = 16), and increasing the Cronbach‟s 
alpha from .62 to .70. Children‟s total scores on the revised SCARED and SNA were positively 
correlated (r(86) = 0.31, p < .01).  
Participants were median split on their self report ratings on the SCARED (Median = 5.5) and 
the SNA (Median = 5). Preliminary analyses revealed that the groups formed differed on age, receptive 
vocabulary, and parental level of education (Table 1). As we were interested in examining the 
relationship between children‟s characteristics and communicative skill over and above language 
abilities, age and verbal skills were covaried out of subsequent analyses. Parental education was not 
correlated to any of the dependent variables (rs(dfs ranging from 64-83) = -.20 to .15, all ps ≥ .07), and 
thus was not used as a covariate for this study. 
2
nd
 Order False Belief and Faux Pas 
Separate 2(Group: low SCARED versus high SCARED) x 2(Group: low SNA versus high SNA) 
ANCOVAs were performed for the 2
nd
 order false belief task. There was a marginal main effect of 
SCARED (F(1,82) = 3.29, p
2
 = .04, p = .07). Children high in social anxiety symptoms were slightly 




than those low in shyness (M = 1.17, SE =.06). Neither the effect of SNA grouping, nor the interaction 
between the two measures, was significant (ps > .40).  
When children‟s performance on the faux pas task was examined, there were no statistically 
significant effects of social anxiety symptoms (p = .26), nor of shy negative affect (p = .21), nor was 
there a significant interaction (p = .42).   Children‟s overall mean score on this task was 1.43 (SE = 
.06), with 38.6% of children getting both questions correct on both stories.  Thus, floor or ceiling 
effects are unlikely.  Therefore, neither social anxiety symptoms nor shy negative affect appeared to be 
related to children‟s ability to comprehend faux pas.   
The lack of significant findings between shyness measures and faux pas understanding was 
surprising, given previous results of Banerjee (2001) demonstrating that shy negative affect was 
negatively correlated to faux pas performance in children who were high on shyness.  In order to 
directly compare our results, we repeated our analyses of the faux pas task using the same statistical 
methodology that was used by Banerjee.  The correlation between SCARED score and faux pas score 
was determined separately for children in the low SNA and high SNA groups.  There were no 
significant correlations between SCARED score and faux pas for either group (rs(40-44) = -.03-0.1, ps 
> .50).  Thus, the results of Banerjee (2001) were not replicated. 
Table 1. Demographics and shyness measure scores for each of the four groups.  
 
Group Age TOLD-I:4 Parental Education SCARED SNA 
Low SCARED/ 
Low SNA 
9.92(0.70) 50.07(6.12)† 3.31(1.08)† 2.54(1.71)† 2.93(1.02)† 
Low SCARED/ 
High SNA 
10.17(0.98)† 47.00(6.77) 2.77(1.36) 2.94(1.44)† 6.25(1.84)* 
High SCARED/ 
Low SNA 
9.78(0.88) 45.00(7.51)* 3.36(1.26) 8.14(1.23)* 2.36(1.34)† 
High SCARED/ 
High SNA 
9.61(0.75) 46.20(8.36)* 2.64(1.11)* 8.83(1.42)* 6.67(1.86)* 




Verbal Irony Task 
Three 2(Group: low SCARED versus high SCARED) x 2(Group: low SNA versus high SNA) x 4 
(Story Type: literal criticism, ironic criticism, literal compliment or ironic compliment) mixed model 
ANCOVAs were performed for each of the variables probed during the verbal irony task. The 2x2x4 
ANCOVAs were shown to violate the sphericity assumption (Mauchly‟s tests of sphericity; W(5) = 
.041-.633, ps < .001), thus, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to the data. Follow up 
analyses were performed when the results of the omnibus ANCOVA were significant (p < .05). Since 
we hypothesized that shy children would react differently to criticism and praise, we followed up 
significant results with ANCOVAs examining criticisms and compliments separately. Tukey‟s HSD 
was used to compare individual means, as indicated for specific results, below. 
Speaker belief. Children‟s accuracy on the speaker belief questions was analyzed. A response 
was considered accurate if, for criticisms, the child rated that the speaker thought the context of the 
story was bad. For compliments, children were deemed accurate when they correctly identified that the 
speaker thought the context was good. The proportion of times that the child correctly identified the 
speaker‟s belief for each statement type was used for analyses. 
The omnibus 2x2x4 ANCOVA revealed a main effect of story type (F(1.34, 109.93) = 5.41, 
p
2 
= .06, p < .05; Figure 1). Tukey‟s HSD procedure was used to compare the age- and TOLD-I:4-
corrected mean belief scores for the four story types. Using this test, any mean differences greater than 
0.217 were deemed significant at the .01 level (r = 4, df = 60). While children were near ceiling on 
their responses to the speaker belief question for literal criticisms, literal compliments and ironic 
criticisms, their performance on ironic compliments was significantly lower (p < .01). Children 
responded as though the ironic compliments were literal criticisms (i.e. the speaker believed the 
performance of the addressee was “bad”) on approximately 40% of the trials. No significant effects of 
social anxiety symptoms nor shy negative affect were found for the speaker belief question (ps > .25). 




speakers‟ beliefs about the situation differed from the literal meaning of their utterances as well as their 
peers without anxiety or negative affect. 
 
Figure 1. Children‟s understanding of the speakers‟ belief varied as a function of story type. Children 
performed significantly worse on ironic compliments (p < .01), than for any of the other story types.  
 
Speaker intent. Similar to the speaker belief question, children‟s ratings of speaker intent were 
coded for accuracy. That is, for criticisms, when the child rated the speaker as being “a little bit mean” 
or “very mean”, the child was considered accurate. For compliments, children were considered 
accurate when they indicated that the speaker was being “a little bit nice” or “very nice”. The 
proportion of times that the child correctly identified the speaker‟s intent was used in further analyses.  
Only those trials where the participant was accurate on the speaker belief question were 
included in these analyses. This was done because understanding that the speaker‟s belief differs from 











































ironic. These analyses revealed a significant main effect of story type (F(2.40, 150.99) = 3.75, p
2 
= 
.06, p < .05; Fig. 2). Children‟s understanding of speaker intent was most accurate, and near ceiling for 
 
Figure 2. Children‟s understanding of the speakers‟ intent varied as a function of story type. Children 
did equally well on both literal statement types, but significantly poorer on ironic criticisms (p < .05) 
and ironic compliments, for which accuracy was the lowest of all four story types (p < .05). 
 
both types of literal statements, which did not significantly differ from each other (Tukey‟s HSD(4, 
120) = 0.215, at p = .05). Their performance was less accurate on ironic criticisms (p < .05) and the  
least accurate on ironic compliments, on which their performance was marginally below ironic 
criticisms (difference between means = 0.213). Approximately two thirds of the time, children 
indicated that speakers making an ironic compliment were being “a little bit mean” or “very mean”. 
There was a marginal three way interaction between story type, SCARED grouping and SNA grouping 
(F(2.40, 150.99) = 2.68, p
2 
= .04, p = .06).  
Thus, children‟s accuracy in comprehending speakers‟ intentions did not differ as a function of 











































these children rated ironic speakers as being meaner overall than did the children who did not struggle 
with these difficulties. Thus, rather than looking at whether children‟s responses were in the correct 
direction as we did for the accuracy variables, above, we calculated a separate variable that examined 
the magnitude of children‟s negative or positive attitude ratings for the speakers in each story. Since 
children rated speaker meanness on a 5 point scale, numeric values were assigned to each rating, with -
2 representing “very mean”, -1 representing “a little bit mean”, 0 representing “not mean, but not nice 
either”, 1 representing “a little bit nice”, and 2 representing “very nice”.  
The omnibus 2x2x4 ANCOVA revealed a main effect of story type (F(2.09,131.80) = 3.86, p
2 
= .06, p < .05). Tukey‟s HSD (4, 120) determined that any mean differences greater than 0.549 were 
significant at the .05 level. Overall, children rated speakers who made literal criticisms as being the 
meanest (M = -1.18, SE = .08, p < .05), followed by ironic criticisms (M = -.511, SE = .10) and ironic 
compliments (M = -.082, SE = .13), which were rated as being nicer than literal criticisms (p < .05), but 
which did not significantly differ from one another. Literal compliments were rated as being “very 
nice” on almost all trials (M = 1.80, SE = .04; p < .01). However, these results are qualified by a 
significant three-way interaction (F(2.09,131.80) = 3.78, p
2 
= .06, p < .05 ). Planned follow-up 
analyses revealed that the interaction between social anxiety symptoms, shy negative affect and story 
type was significant when comparing literal and ironic criticisms (F(1,81) = 13.41, p
2 
= .14, p < .001; 
Fig.3), and was marginal for literal and ironic compliments (F(1,63) = 3.76, p
2 
= .06, p = .06). 
Children with social anxiety symptoms, shy negative affect, or both, rated speakers who made ironic 
criticisms as being significantly meaner than did children who were low on both social anxiety and shy 
negative affect (Tukey‟s HSD(8, 60) = 0.508, at p = .01). Children with shyness and shy negative affect 
did not rate speakers who made literal criticisms as any meaner than did children low on both of these 
dimensions (p > .05). 
Speaker teasing. Children‟s ratings of whether speakers were teasing were also analyzed. 





Figure 3. The average magnitude of children‟s ratings of the speaker‟s communicative intent varied as 
a function of their social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect, for criticisms. Children made 
ratings on a 5 point Likert scale where 2 = very nice, 0 = not nice but not mean either, and -2 = very 
mean.  
 
the correct direction, to ensure that the results only included cases where the children accurately 
comprehended sarcastic intent. However, this left too few data points to allow the children to be broken 
into groups based on their SCARED and SNA scores (e.g., the high SCARED/low SNA group only has 
three participants with data). As such, these data were analyzed using a univariate ANCOVA collapsed 
across children‟s ratings of social anxiety and shy negative affect. Overall, when asked whether 
speakers in the stories were “teasing” or “being real”, children‟s ratings depended on story type 
(F(1.87, 37.37) = 43.621, p
2
 = .69, p < .001; Fig.4). Children correctly identified that speakers were 
“being real” for literal criticisms and compliments, which did not differ from each other (Tukey‟s HSD 






























































Figure 4. Children‟s comprehension of the teasing function of irony varied by story type. Children 
rated speakers as either „teasing‟ (rating = 1), „being real‟ (rating = -1) and „not teasing but not real 
either‟ (rating = 0). While children correctly identified that speakers making literal statements were not 
teasing, and that speakers of ironic compliments were teasing, they had significantly greater difficulty 
understanding that speakers of ironic criticisms were teasing (p < .05).  
 
ratings of speakers who made ironic criticisms did not significantly differ from a response of “not 
teasing, but not real either” (i.e. a score of 0 on the scale, which ranged from -1 to 1; p > .05). 
Relationship between 2
nd
 Order False Belief, Faux Pas, and Verbal Irony 
Regressions were performed to examine whether SCARED or SNA scores predicted performance on 
any of the verbal irony measures over and above age, receptive vocabulary (as measured by the 
TOLD:I-4), 2
nd
 order false belief skills, and the faux pas task. Separate hierarchical multiple 
regressions were performed for ironic criticisms and ironic compliments on the speaker belief ratings, 
and magnitude of intent ratings (Table 2). Age, and TOLD:I-4 score were entered on the first step, 
followed by 2
nd
 order false belief and faux pas scores on the second step, SCARED score on the third 



































since they were used as measures of two separable components of children‟s experience of shyness.  
Furthermore, adding SCARED and SNA scores on separate steps of the hierarchical regression made it 
possible to determine whether the inclusion of each in the model would cause a significant change in 
the model‟s predictive ability (i.e. whether each would cause a significant change in R
2
).  
For ironic criticisms, shy negative affect was the only statistically significant predictor of children‟s 
responses to the speaker belief question (t(81) = 2.415, p < .05), accounting for 6.0% of the variance.  
Social anxiety symptoms predicted speaker belief responses marginally (t(81) = 1.75, p = .08), 
accounting for 3.2% of the variance. When looking at children‟s responses to the speaker intent 
question, TOLD:I-4 score was a statistically significant predictor (t(80) = 2.90, p < .01), accounting for 
8.5% of the variance, as was shy negative affect (t(80) = 2.06, p < .05), accounting for 4.3% of the 
variance in children‟s intent ratings. In contrast, for ironic compliments, 2
nd
 order false belief 
understanding accounted for 5.0% of the variance children‟s responses to the speaker belief (t(81) = 
2.14, p < .05) and marginally predicted their responses to the speaker intent questions (t(62) = 1.91, p = 
.061), for which age was also a significant predictor (t(62) = 3.18, p < .01), accounting for 12.6% of the 
variance. Thus, while shy negative affect predicted a modest proportion of the variance in children‟s 
ratings of speakers‟ communicative intentions for ironic criticisms, age was the most significant 
















Step 1:     
Age .191; 0.040(0.026) -.152; -0.171(0.136) .184; 0.090(0.062) .445**; 0.595(0.187) 
TOLD:I-4 .101; 0.002(0.003) .337**; 0.041(0.014) .073; 0.004(0.007) -.181; -0.026(0.018) 
Step 2:     
2
nd
 Order False Belief .179; 0.079(0.049) -.056; -0.129(0.253) .241*; 0.248(0.116) .238†; 0.630(0.330) 
Faux Pas -.040; -.012(.032) -.091; -.146(.166) 0.148; .106(.077) .096; .191(.226) 
Step 3:     
SCARED -.200†; -0.010(0.006) -.104; -0.028(0.030) -.065; -0.008(0.014) -.072; -0.023(0.041) 
Step 4:     
SNA .270*; 0.019(0.008) -.227*; -0.082(0.040) .088; 0.014(0.019) -.168; -0.076(0.056) 
R
2 
.064 .116 .046 .109 
ΔR
2
 Step 2 .02 .005 .064† .078† 
ΔR
2
 Step 3 .011 .030† .001 .016 
ΔR
2
 Step 4 .061* .043* .006 .023 
N 87 86 88 68 








This study examined whether children with shyness, as indexed by social anxiety symptoms and shy 
negative affect, have more difficulty appreciating verbal irony. It was hypothesized that shy children 
would rate ironic speakers as being meaner than would their non-shy peers. To examine this 
hypothesis, children were presented with vignettes where one child character made a criticism or a 
compliment of another child that was either literal or ironic. Several key findings about the interplay 
between social-communicative measures and temperamental features emerged. 
First, similar to previous studies on irony comprehension (e.g., Climie & Pexman, 2008; Harris 
& Pexman, 2003), 8- to 11-year-old children, were able to interpret ironic criticisms on the majority of 
trials, but interpreted ironic compliments correctly on fewer than half of the trials. That is, children had 
difficulty understanding that speakers who made ironic compliments believed that the context was 
good, and that the speaker was being nice. Furthermore, children correctly identified that speakers 
making ironic compliments were teasing, but had more difficulty identifying the teasing function of 
ironic criticisms. Thus, for ironic criticisms, children had the most difficulty understanding the teasing 
function of the statements, while, for ironic compliments, children had the most difficulty 
understanding the communicative intentions of the speakers.  
The results from this study are generally consistent with previous work demonstrating that 
children‟s understanding of the components of verbal irony follows a predictable sequence that differs 
for ironic criticisms and ironic compliments. For example, similar to our findings, Pexman and 
Glenwright (2007) found that for both ironic criticisms and ironic compliments children understand the 
speaker‟s belief first. For ironic criticisms, after understanding that speakers‟ beliefs differ from the 
literal meaning of their utterances, children next understand the speaker‟s attitude (i.e., whether the 
speaker is being mean or nice; labeled “intent” in this study) and whether the speaker is teasing (i.e., 




those of Pexman and Glenwright (2007). While children in our study understood that speakers who 
made ironic criticisms intended to be mean, they did not fully appreciate the teasing function of ironic 
criticisms. This finding, however, is consistent with studies demonstrating that the social functions of 
irony, such as humor, are the last components of irony comprehension to develop (Dews et al, 1996). 
Children had difficulty interpreting the communicative intention of speakers who made ironic 
compliments. Approximately two thirds of the time children responded that speakers who made ironic 
compliments were being “a little bit mean” or “very mean”. However, when children responded 
correctly to the intention question, they were also able to correctly identify that the speakers of ironic 
compliments were teasing. This is consistent with results from Pexman and Glenwright (2007) who 
found that children understand the teasing nature of ironic compliments before they understand the 
speaker‟s communicative intent.  
Central to the main purpose, we examined whether children who possessed higher levels of 
social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect interpreted ironic language differently than their non-
shy peers. Results demonstrated that children with social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect did 
not differ from their peers in their ability to correctly identify ironic statements. That is, they were as 
capable of identifying the speaker‟s belief on the ironic stories as children with low social anxiety 
symptoms and shy negative affect. What differed, however, was the degree of negative attitude that 
children with social anxiety symptoms and/or shy negative affect ascribed to speakers who made ironic 
criticisms. One significant social function of irony is its muting effect on the intended message. That is, 
the use of irony renders criticisms less aggressive, and praise less complimentary, than would be direct 
literal statements. While children without difficulties in social anxiety or shy negative affect rated 
ironic criticisms as less “mean” than literal criticisms, children with social anxiety symptoms and 
negative affect showed less of this muting effect, rating speakers who made ironic criticisms as being 
significantly meaner than did their peers.  
The difference in understanding of the attitude of ironic speakers evidenced by shy children did 




and shy negative affect were able to correctly answer questions assessing 2
nd
 order false belief and faux 
pas understanding as well as their non-shy peers.  The latter finding is contrary to findings by Banerjee 
and Henderson (2001) who found that shy negative affect predicted faux pas understanding in children 
with social anxiety symptoms. The discrepancy in these findings may be due to differences in 
methodology.  Banerjee and Henderson (2001) median split participants on social anxiety symptoms, 
and then used correlation to examine the relationship between shy negative affect and faux pas 
understanding.  In the current study, participants were median split on both social anxiety symptoms 
and shy negative affect, and ANCOVA was used to assess both constructs individually, as well as their 
interaction. This was done under the assumption that social anxiety symptoms and shy negative affect 
are related but separate components of a child‟s experience of shyness. Nevertheless, when the 
analyses were repeated to in the manner of Banerjee and Henderson (2001), the finding that in children 
who were high on social anxiety symptoms, shy negative affect was correlated to faux pas 
understanding (albeit marginally). Thus, it is likely that there is a relationship between shyness and 
faux pas understanding, although the power of our study was not able to reveal this relationship using 
ANCOVA. 
It is also unlikely that the difference in construal of the attitude of ironic speakers is due to a 
general negativity bias in shy children. Specifically, these children did not rate speakers of literal 
criticisms any more negatively than did children low on social anxiety symptoms and shy negative 
affect. Instead, in line with research showing that children with social anxiety symptoms tend to 
interpret ambiguous stimuli as threatening (e.g., Muris et al, 2003), it is likely that the ambiguity 
inherent in the ironic statements requires more inference on the part of the child, allowing these threat 
biases to be revealed.  
 Regression analyses revealed that shy negative affect significantly predicted children‟s 
understanding of speaker‟s beliefs and intentions (although the latter had marginal statistical 
significance) over and above age, receptive vocabulary, and 2
nd
 order false belief performance. Thus, 




understand figurative language. However, for ironic compliments, no effects of social anxiety 
symptoms or shy negative affect were found. Only 2
nd
 order false belief performance was found to 
predict children‟s performance on the speaker belief question, and with age, to predict ratings of 
speakers‟ communicative intention (i.e., how mean or nice they were being). This finding is consistent 
with studies demonstrating that theory of mind predicts verbal irony comprehension (e.g., Filippova & 
Astington, 2008), but does not support our hypothesis that shyness would affect interpretation of both 
ironic criticisms and ironic compliments. However, all children, regardless of shyness ratings, 
experienced significant difficulty comprehending ironic compliments, identifying the irony less than 
half the time. It may be that once, in general, children gain a better understanding of ironic 
compliments an effect of shyness would emerge. This notion is supported by the fact that age was the 
most significant predictor of children‟s ratings of speakers‟ communicative intent, suggesting that 
comprehension of this language form is still developing in this age group. Therefore, to fully elucidate 
the potential impact of shyness on children‟s understanding of ironic compliments, an older sample 
should be assessed. 
Our research demonstrates that shy children have a different appreciation of the pragmatics of 
verbal irony, perceiving ironic speakers as being more negative than do children who are not shy. 
These findings add to previous work demonstrating that children‟s shyness is related to the appropriate 
use of language in common social contexts (Coplan & Weeks, 2009). A negative interpretation of the 
attitude of ironic speakers could lead shy children to be more easily offended by their peers, leading to 
adverse social outcomes. Indeed, there is evidence demonstrating that pragmatic language ability may 
actually have a buffering effect on shyness (Coplan & Weeks, 2009). For example, shy children with 
better pragmatic language abilities (as measured by knowledge of social conventions) at the beginning 
of the school year had fewer negative social outcomes and more prosocial behavior at the end of the 
school year. Furthermore, boys with strong expressive pragmatic language skills showed a decrease in 
shyness over the school year (Coplan & Weeks, 2009). If mastery of basic social conventions is 




understanding of more complex social language, such as figurative language, could serve an additional 
protective function for shy children. At the same time, it could be that those children who are more 
socially engaged have the opportunity to develop stronger pragmatic language understanding. 
Interventions aimed at improving pragmatic language understanding, including figurative language, 
could help to tease apart these two potential pathways. Therefore, more research in this area is 
indicated. 
Since our language system is inherently ambiguous, children are continually faced with having 
to reason between different interpretive options. In this study we show that shy children have a 
negative bias when interpreting ironic criticisms. It may be that this bias is present in other aspects of 
communication not examined here. Furthermore, it may be that poor communicative competence is one 
mechanism causing shy children to experience negative psychological trajectories and social 
difficulties. Shy children‟s appraisal of ironic speakers as being meaner than non-shy peers would rate 
them, revealed in this study, could lead to misunderstandings and to shy children taking greater offence 
to ironic teasing than other children would. Since irony is used to save face while providing negative 
feedback and to avoid damaging relationships (Dews et al., 1995), shy children‟s interpretations of 
irony are likely to be especially problematic when it comes to maintaining peer relationships. Negative 
peer encounters could lead to further withdrawal from social interactions. Increased isolation would 
further limit these children‟s exposure to figurative language and other social stimuli, preventing 
experiential learning, and potentially leading to further difficulties in social understanding. Indeed, shy 
children report poor friendship quality with their mutually identified best friends (Rubin, 
Wojslawowicz, Rose-Krasnor, Booth-LaForce, & Burgess, 2006). These peer difficulties are especially 
problematic, since having high quality friendships has been found to be a protective factor against 
developing internalizing problems, poor self esteem (Rubin, Dwyer, Booth-LaForce, Kim, & Krasnor, 
2004) and symptoms of depression (Gazelle & Ladd, 2003), of which shy children are at risk of 
developing (Coplan & Armer, 2005; Coplan, Closson, & Arbeau, 2007; Prior, Smart, Sanson, & 




which to improve shy children‟s peer relationships, and to reduce other negative psychological and 
social sequelae of shyness. 
In sum, although children who reported higher levels of social anxiety symptoms and shy 
negative affect comprehended ironic language, they judged ironic speakers to be meaner than did their 
peers. This negative perception of others‟ attitudes in social situations is likely to lead to 
misunderstandings or negative social interactions which may further limit shy children‟s exposure to 
figurative language. Improving figurative language understanding and pragmatic competence are 
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Sample Verbal Irony Vignette 
Positive Context 
 
Literal compliment. „Chris and Tara are playing mini-golf on a field trip. They are on the 
same team. Tara thinks she is a really good mini-golf player. Tara hits the ball and he scores a hole-in-
one. Chris says, “Boy, that was an awesome shot!”‟ 
 
Ironic compliment. „Chris and Tara are playing mini-golf on a field trip. They are on the same 
team. Tara thinks she is a really awful mini-golf player. Tara hits the ball and he scores a hole-in-one. 





Literal criticism. „Chris and Tara are playing mini-golf on a field trip. They are on the same 
team. Tara thinks she is a really awful mini-golf player. Tara hits the ball and completely misses the 
hole. Chris says, “Boy, that was an awful shot!”‟ 
 
Ironic criticism. „Chris and Tara are playing mini-golf on a field trip. They are on the same 
team. Tara thinks she is a really good mini-golf player. Tara hits the ball and completely misses the 






Sample Second Order False Belief Vignette 
Story text and questions from Coull, Leekam, and Bennett (2006, p.563) – based on Sullivan, Zaitchik, 
and Tager-Flusberg, 1994. 
 
„Tonight it is Peter‟s birthday and Mum is surprising him with a puppy. She has hidden the puppy in 
the basement. Peter says, “Mum, I really hope you get me a puppy for my birthday.” Remember, Mum 
wants to surprise Peter with a puppy. So, instead of telling Peter she got him a puppy, Mum says, 
“Sorry Peter, I did not get you a puppy for your birthday. I got you a really great toy instead.”‟ 
 
Probe question 1: „Did Mum really get Peter a toy for his birthday?‟  
Probe question 2: „Did Mum tell Peter she got him a toy for his birthday?‟  
Probe question 3: „Why did Mum tell Peter that she got him a toy for his birthday?‟ 
 
„Now, Peter says to Mum, “I‟m going outside to play.” On his way outside, Peter goes to the basement 
to fetch his football. In the basement room, Peter finds the birthday puppy! Peter says to himself, 
“Wow, Mum didn‟t get me a toy, she really got me a puppy for my birthday.” Mum does not see Peter 
go down to the basement and find the birthday puppy.‟ 
 
Nonlinguistic control question: „Does Peter know that his Mum got him a puppy for his birthday?‟  
 
„Now, the doorbell rings, ding-a-ling! Peter‟s grandmother is at the door to find to bring the cake for 
the party. Grandma asks Mum, “Does Peter know what you really got him for his birthday?”‟ 
 
Second-order ignorance question: „What does Mum say to Grandma?‟ 
 
Memory aid: „Now remember, Mum does not know that Peter saw what she got him 
for his birthday.‟ 
 
„Then, Grandma says to Mum, “What does Peter think you got him for his birthday?”‟ 
Second-order false-belief question: „What does Mum say to Grandma?‟  






Sample Faux Pas Vignette 
 
Story text from Baron-Cohen, O‟Riordan, Stone, James, and Plaisted (1999, p.416) and questions 
adapted from those of Banerjee (2000). 
 
 
„This is Jeff and this is Cara. Cara bought Jeff a toy airplane for her birthday.  A few months later, they 
were playing with it, and Cara accidentally dropped it.  “Don‟t worry” said Jeff, “I never liked it 
anyway.  Someone gave it to me for my birthday.”‟ 
 
„Did somebody say something wrong in this story? Who?‟ (Next questions only asked if the first two 
were answered correctly). „Did Jeff upset Cara on purpose? How do you know that Jeff [child‟s 
response]? What did Cara give Jeff for his birthday? Did Jeff remember Cara had given him the toy 
airplane for his birthday?‟ 
 
 
